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In an earlier study, a negative relationship was found between faculty unionism and 
organizational effectiveness in colleges and universities. No research, however, has ever 
investigated potential causality in this relationship, that is, whether ineffectiveness leads 
to unionism or whether unionism leads to ineffectiveness. This study relies on assess- 
ments of organizational effectiveness in a sample of 4-year institutions in 1976, 1980, 
and 1983 to investigate the potential causal directionality of these two factors. The 
results of the analyses suggest that ineffectiveness leads to unionism, but that once 
unionized, organizational effectiveness does not seem to improve. 
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Little is known about the impact of collective bargaining in higher educa- 
tion, and speculation and opinion still dominate the literature (see Baldridge 
et al., 1981; Gilmore, 1981; Wilson, 1983). A number of investigators have 
studied factors that seem to motivate the formation of unions (see Carr and 
Van Eyck, 1973; Duryea, Fisk, and Associates, 1973; Garbarino, 1975; Kem- 
erer and Baldridge, 1975), but investigations of the effects of unionism have 
been few. Moreover, no study has investigated the cause-effect relationship 
between unionism and organizational effectiveness. Previous outcomes or 
effect studies have been limited mainly to individual-level factors and tradi- 
tional trade union variables such as participation, grievances, compensa- 
tion, and working conditions (see Baldridge et al., 1978; Bennett and John- 
son, 1979; Birnbaum, 1974, 1976; Brown and Stone, 1977; Hedgepeth, 1974; 
Kemerer and Baldridge, 1975; Keaveny and Allen, 1979; Ladd and Lipset, 
1978; Morgan and Kearney, 1977; Mortimer, 1975). Contradictory findings 
have been found regarding the impact of unions on these factors, and little 
longitudinal research had been done to help clarify the relationships. For 
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example, Guthrie-Morse et al., (1981) found that under some conditions 
nonunion faculties have received higher compensation than union faculties, 
but under other conditions the reverse is true. Birnbaum (1980) summarized 
literature arguing that decreased participation and communication occur on 
unionized campuses, whereas Baldridge and Kemerer (1981) summarized 
literature arguing just the reverse. Shanker (1978), Cameron (1982), Lom- 
bardi (1979), and others found that the relative power of the faculty in- 
creases relative to administrators under unionized conditions. Richardson 
and Mortimer (1979), Baldridge et al. (1981), Baldridge and Tierney (1979), 
and others reported the opposite; that is, that administrator power increases 
relative to the faculty. 
In addition to this ambiguity regarding individual-level factors, confusion 
and lack of clarity also are presented regarding the relationship between 
unionism and organizational-level factors. These variables have been in- 
cluded in research much less frequently than individual-level variables, 
although some studies have begun to appear. Kerr (1980) pointed out that 
"collective bargaining, in nearly all situations, has its origins more in antag- 
onism than in affection, in hate than in love" (p. v). Consequently, the 
formation of unions is expected to affect the climate of colleges and univer- 
sities and the processes of governance. For example, Wilson et al. (1983) 
found "significant changes" in governance, academic freedom, administra- 
tor and faculty attitudes, and performance when comparing pre- and post- 
union conditions. Moore (1981) reported major alterations in trust, stan- 
dardization, centralization, and leadership style associated with unionism. 
Richardson and Mortimer (1978) found increases rigidity and decreased 
innovation in unionized schools (although they speculated that these condi- 
tions would decrease over time), and Baldridge et al. (1978) reported more 
formalization, standardization, and centralization of procedures when 
unionism was present. Gilmore (1981) reported changes from collegial to 
adversarial relationships among faculty and administrators and greater spe- 
cialization of functions. 
On the other hand, Birnbaum and Inman (1983) reported that no signifi- 
cant change occurred on the Institutional Functioning Inventory dimensions 
(including academic freedom, governance, administrator and faculty atti- 
tudes, leader style, morale, innovation, adaptability, etc.) between 1970 and 
1980 for unionized versus nonunionized schools. Birnbaum and Inman 
(1983) concluded as follows: 
Overall, therefore, recent research is building up a cumulative, consistent, and 
impressive picture of faculty collective bargaining as a process having surprisingly 
little impact upon many important aspects of institutional life. Neither those who 
have feared bargaining as a threat to traditional processes and values, nor those 
who have welcomed it as a universal corrective for continuing problems can find 
support for their positions in these studies. (pp. 9-10) 
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Baldridge et ai. (1981) reached a similar conclusion after a nationwide 
survey of faculty and administrators regarding unionism: 
Administrators say unions have hurt a little, while union officials say unions have 
helped a little-but overall, the impression is that not much has changed. Faculty 
collective bargaining has not brought about the revolutionary changes its detrac- 
tors and its supporters had predicted. (pp. 6, 46) 
Differences in the findings of all these investigations may be due to vari- 
ance in the definitions and measurements of unionism, to the different types 
of institutions used in each study, to the scarcity of longitudinal analyses, or 
to other factors embedded in the research designs. Regardless of the sources 
of confusion, however, it is clear that the topic of faculty unionism and its 
relationship to the functioning of institutions of higher education is a con- 
troversial and often emotional topic. Proponents and antagonists of union- 
ism have argued their cases with vehemence. 
UNIONISM AND EFFECTIVENESS 
Several years ago research was conducted that contributed to this contro- 
versy surrounding the contributions and distractions of unionism in higher 
education (Cameron, 1982). That study investigated the relationship be- 
tween faculty unionism and organizational effectiveness in colleges and 
universities and was based on cross-sectional data that precluded any causal 
conclusions from being drawn. In that investigation, unionized institutions 
scored lower than nonunionized institutions on eight of nine dimensions of 
organizational effectiveness. It was not clear, however, whether ineffective 
organizational performance preceded unionized faculties, whether union- 
ization led to ineffective performance, or whether some kind of mutual 
causation was present between unionism and the dimensions of organiza- 
tional effectiveness. 
Some agitation resulted from the discovery of this negative relationship as 
proponents of and antagonists to unionism attributed opposite causal direc- 
tion to the results. Opponents of unionism argued that the effectiveness of 
institutions is damaged by unionization of the faculty. After unions form, 
institutional effectiveness decreases, they argued. Proponents of unionism, 
on the other hand, suggested that ineffective {nstitutional performance is a 
primary motivation for faculties to unionize. They argued that ineffective- 
ness causes unionism, therefore, and unions help restore higher levels of 
effectiveness after forming. 
Unfortunately, no information has been available to support either point 
of view. Up to now, no study has been conducted to investigate associations 
between unionism and effectiveness using longitudinal data. In fact, Naples 
et al., (1978) summarized the current state of understanding regarding the 
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effects of  unionism on institutional performance this way: 
The jury is still out on the issue of the impacts of collective bargaining . . . .  
Research is virtually non-existent and experiences are inconclusive. While it is 
difficult to conclude that faculty collective bargaining has damaged academic 
performance and vitality, the fact remains that a strong potential exists for this to 
occur. (pp. 95-96) 
The major purpose of  this paper is to investigate the causal relationships 
between the organizational effectiveness of  colleges and universities and 
faculty unionism. Because the earlier study found that effectiveness scores 
are lower in unionized institutions than nonunionized institutions (Cam- 
eron, 1982), the intent of this current study is to address the question: Does 
ineffectiveness lead to unionization or does unionization lead to ineffective- 
ness? 
METHODOLOGY 
Identifying causality in the relationships between variables is most 
straightforward in experimental design. The application of  treatment effects 
as well as other potential intervening variables can be controlled sufficiently 
that causal relationships between variables become clear (see Campbell and 
Stanley, 1963). The problem with studying the relationship between union- 
ism and effectiveness, however, is that neither the treatment nor the poten- 
tial extraneous causal factors can be controlled. That  is, one cannot control 
when a faculty union will form, nor can one arbitrarily manipulate the 
performance of  a college or university. In the earlier investigation, mean 
scores on effectiveness dimensions were compared between unionized and 
nonunionized institutions, and correlations between unionism and effective- 
ness were computed, but no causal conclusions could be drawn from either 
procedure. 
Cross-lagged Correlation Analysis 
In the absence of  careful controls, therefore, as well as the absence of an 
expected theoretical relationship between unionism and effectiveness upon 
which path analysis (regression analysis) depends, the cross-lagged correla- 
tional technique is the most appropriate procedure to try to draw out pat- 
terns of causality (Campbell, 1963). Cross-lagged correlation is primarily an 
exploratory procedure designed to uncover "the preponderance of causa- 
tion" (Crano et al., 1972) by eliminating alternative explanations owing to 
supuriousness (Kenny, 1975). Spuriousness refers to the condition where the 
relationship between two variables is not due to the effects of  either, but to a 
UNIONISM AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 391 
third extraneous variable. The purpose of  this analysis, therefore, is to iden- 
tify which of  two variables seems to be more powerful in affecting the other, 
while eliminating alternative causal explanations. 
Kenny and Harackiewicz (1979) pointed out that cross-lagged analysis is 
largely an exploratory approach for generating interesting causal hypothe- 
ses. It is to be viewed more as an indicator of  temporal precedence than as 
positive proof  of causation. Because there is no a priori reason to expect 
unionism to lead to ineffectiveness or for ineffectiveness to lead to union- 
ism, however, investigating this temporal precedence is a necessary first step 
in understanding the potential causal relationship between these two factors. 
Cross-lagged correlational analysis requires at least two variables, each 
measured at two or more points in time. If  one variable (e.g., unionism), 
measured at time 1, is consistently followed by a change in the other variable 
(e.g., effectiveness), measured at time 2, and if the converse relationship is 
not true, then one can infer a causal association and direction. Correlations 
are computed between variable A at time 1 with variable B at time 2, and 
also between variable B at time 1 with variable A at time 2. It is rare that 
either of  those two correlations is zero, because not only is it likely that some 
random correlation exists, but reciprocal causality is a common phenome- 
non among factors. However, if one correlation coefficient is significantly 
larger than another, a preponderance of causality can be assumed. 
It should be emphasized that temporal precedence and causality are not 
precisely the same thing. One factor could conceivably appear before an- 
other factor on a consistent basis without influencing it causally. However, 
because it is impossible to manipulate either variable in this relationship, 
and because no prior information is available regarding the potential causal 
relationship between unionism and effectiveness, establishing temporal 
precedence is an informative first step in the causality debate. The cross- 
lagged correlational technique is useful for establishing temporal precedence 
or directionality and for screening potentially spurious variables. Order 
precedence is a necessary condition for causality to be established, but it is 
not a sufficient condition. 
Four different conditions must be met in cross-lagged analysis in order to 
eliminate the possibility of  spurious correlations or uninterpreted results 
(Clegg et al., 1977; Kenny, 1975; Crano et al., 1972; Kenny and Harack- 
iewicz, 1979). The first condition requires that the variables being assessed 
are reliable or that all measures of the same factor at one point in time are 
highly correlated. Second, synchronicity must be present in the two vari- 
ables being assessed. This means that the two variables must be measured at 
the same point in time. Synchronicity can be inspected by observing the 
correlations between variable A at time 1 and variable B at time 1, and the 
correlation between variable A at time 2 and variable B at time 2. Both 
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correlations are expected to be moderate to high (i.e., approximately .3 or 
above). The third condition requires moderate stability or autocorrelation 
coefficients in at least one of  the two variables. That is, when measuring 
variables at two points in time, some changes must occur in one of the 
variables between the two assessment points in order for a causal association 
to be determined. A variable that does not change cannot be influenced by a 
second variable that does not change (Clegg et al., 1977). The fourth condi- 
tion, stationarity, means that the same causal relationship is present at the 
two points of measurement. The same causes of  a variable exist at time 2 as 
existed at time 1. This required condition implies that cross-lagged analysis 
is most appropriate when a causal relationship has stabilized, and it is less 
appropriate under turbulent or rapid change conditions when causality is 
not in equilibrium (Randolph, 1981). Stationarity can be tested by inspecting 
the patterns of  cross-lag differentials and the synchronous correlations (rA,n2 
and rB,82). Perfect stationarity exists when the synchronous coefficients do 
not change over time or they change by some constant, and when thepattern 
of cross-lagged differentials does not change over time. 
The extent to which these four conditions-reliabili ty,  synchronicity, sta- 
bility, and s ta t ionar i ty -a re  present in this investigation are explained in a 
later section. 
Inst rument  
Organizational effectiveness was assessed in this investigation by an in- 
strument first reported in Cameron (1978) and analyzed further in Cameron 
(1981, 1982, 1983, 1986). The instrument relies on judgments by internal 
dominant coalition members of the degree to which the organization pos- 
sesses certain characteristics indicative of effective organizations. Nine valid 
and reliable dimensions of  effectiveness are assessed by the instrument. 
Internal consistency reliabilities are high for the nine dimensions, and a 
variance component analysis (Kavanagh et al., 1971) of  a multitrait-multi- 
method matrix shows that the convergent and discriminant validities of 
these dimensions are good. Correlations with objective indicators of  effec- 
tiveness also provide evidence for the external validity of the dimensions (see 
Cameron, in press). That  is, the dimensions have been found to indicate 
characteristics of  institutional performance, and they are not simply prod- 
ucts of respondents' a priori attitudes. Statistical analyses also reveal that 
when rating the effectiveness of their institutions on the nine dimensions, 
faculty, administrator, and trustee judgments are essentially the same. No 
statistically significant differences are present. 
The nine dimensions of  effectiveness and their definitions are the follow- 
ing: 
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1. Student educational satisfaction - The degree to which students are satis- 
fied with their educational experiences at the institution 
2. Student academic development-The degree of academic attainment, 
growth, and progress of students and the academic opportunities pro- 
vided by the institution 
3. Student career development-The degree of occupational development 
of students and the emphasis and opportunities for career development 
provided by the institution 
4. Student personal development-The degree of nonacademic, noncareer 
development (e.g., cultural, social) and the emphasis and opportunities 
for personal development provided by the institution 
5. Faculty and administrator employment satisfaction- The satisfaction of 
faculty members and administrators with their employment 
6. Professional development and quality o f  the facu l t y -The  degree of pro- 
fessional attainment and development of the faculty and the emphasis 
and opportunities for professional development provided by the institu- 
tion 
7. System openness and community interaction-The emphasis placed on 
and success in interacting with, adapting to, and service in the external 
environment 
8. Ability to acquire resources-The ability of the institution to acquire 
resources such as good students and faculty, financial support, and so on 
9. Organizational health--The vitality and benevolence of the internal 
processes in the institution, such as openness and trust, problem-solving 
adequacy, shared information 
Sample 
The effectiveness questionnaire was administered to respondents in a sam- 
ple of 4-year colleges and universities in 1976, 1980, and 1983. The sample 
was selected originally in order to maximize heterogeneity on institutional 
characteristics such as urban-rural, public-private, large-small (although all 
schools are less than 12,000 undergraduate FTE), unionized-nonunionized, 
and representing all 4-year NCHEMS classes of institutions. Confidentiality 
was promised, so names of schools are not used in this paper. In 1976, 41 
institutions participated; in 1980, 29 of those same institutions participated; 
and in 1983, 26 of the institutions participated. Eighteen of the schools were 
common to all three studies. The number of respondents was 1,317 in 1976, 
1,240 in 1980, and 246 in 1983. Respondents in each study consisted of 
academic, financial, student affairs, and general administrators, faculty de- 
partment heads, and members of boards of trustees. These respondents 
represent the internal dominant coalition in colleges and universities (see 
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TABLE 1. Characteristics of the Institutions in the 1976, 1980, and 1983 Samples 
Number of Number Public Number Average 
Year Schools and (Private) Unionized Enrollment 
1976 41 17 (24) 18 4,894 
1980 29 11 (18) 12 4,200 
1983 26 13 (13) 13 4,232 
Cameron, 1978; Pennings and Goodman,  1977) in that they are the major 
decision makers in the institutions, they tend to have an overall institutional 
perspective rather than a narrow view of  their school, they are normally 
charged with helping to make the institution function effectively, and they 
represent the major internal stakeholders in the institution. In each of  the 
3 years, approximately half the respondents were faculty members, around 
40% were administrators, and the rest were trustees. 
There is no way to tell if the same people completed the questionnaire 
each time.' Therefore, there is no reason to expect major respondent bias in 
the three separate questionnaire administrations. Institutional characteris- 
tics are listed in Table 1 for the sample in each of  the 3 years. 
Procedures 
Questionnaires were administered three times instead of  the two times 
required by cross-lagged analysis because there is no a priori  time period 
that is appropriate for testing a potential causal association between union- 
ism and effectiveness. Effects may occur in the short run, or a longer time 
may be required for them to appear. The design of  this study makes it 
possible to investigate causal associations with time lags as close as 3 years 
or as long as 7 years. It is unlikely that significant changes would occur in 
the nine dimensions of  effectiveness measured in this study in a year or two, 
and cross-lagged analysis is inappropriate in conditions of  marked change 
or turbulence. Therefore, at least a 3-year time span was deemed appropriate 
between questionnaire administrations in order for effects to stabilize. The 
relative stability of  any proposed causal relationships can be determined by 
using the longer time frame in connection with the shorter time frame (see 
Tsui and Karwan, 1983). 
Mean scores were computed for each of the institutions on each of  the 
nine dimensions of  effectiveness (OE), and an overall mean score (i.e., an 
average of  the nine scores) was also determined. These scores were correlated 
with two measures of  u n i o n i s m - t h e  presence or absence of a union (Up) 
and the number of  years the union has been in existence at the school (U~). 
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FIG. 1. Cross-lagged correlation models for investigating the relationship between 
effectiveness and unionism. 
Consistent with the requirements of  cross-lagged analysis, pair-wise correla- 
tions for each of the 3 years were analyzed, as shown in Figure 1. 
RESULTS 
A comparison of  effectiveness scores on the nine dimensions for union- 
ized versus nonunionized institutions reveals that in each of the three years, 
unionized institutions generally score lower than nonunionized institutions. 
For example, a comparison of  the overall average effectiveness score for the 
unionized schools with the overall average effectiveness score for the non- 
unionized schools reveals that in 1976 nonunionized institutions scored sig- 
nificantly higher than unionized schools at the p < .01 level, in 1980 at the 
p < .001 level, and in 1983 at the p <  .01 level. 
Figure 2 plots the mean scores of  the two groups for 1976, 1980, and 1983 
and shows that unionized schools have lower scores on eight of  nine dimen- 
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FIG. 2. A comparison of means on nine dimensions of effectiveness for unionized 
versus nonunionized institutions. Solid line, unionized; dotted line, nonunionized. 
sions in 1983. Unionized schools scored higher on one dimension in 1980 
and one dimension in 1983; there was one dimension in each year where 
scores were tied. 
Tests for significant differences among means revealed that the three 
dimensions constituting the "academic domain" of  the institutions (see 
Cameron,  1981) were significantly higher for nonunionized schools in each 
of  the 3 years (i.e., nonunionized institutions scored higher on Student 
Academic Development, Professional Development and Quality of  the Fac- 
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ulty, and Ability to Acquire Resources). In addition, significant differences 
existed for five other dimensions in 1980 and for two other dimensions in 
1983.2 
These analyses confirm earlier findings showing unionized schools to be 
less effective overall than nonunionized schools. However, the causal direc- 
tion cannot be determined just by comparing mean scores. In order to 
determine which factor comes first, unionism or ineffectiveness, other anal- 
yses are required. 
For example, the two institutions in the sample that formed unions be- 
tween the first data collection effort in 1976 and the second data collection 
effort in 1980 were analyzed to see what changes occurred in their effective- 
ness scores. Both institutions experienced a substantial decrease in their 
overall mean effectiveness score between 1976 and the later data collection 
periods. However, because generalizing from a sample of  two is tenuous, 
and because other ins t i tu t ions -bo th  unionized and nonun ion ized-a l so  
experienced decreases, no conclusions can be drawn from those data. In- 
stead, it is necessary to perform the cross-lagged correlation analysis for the 
two models shown in Figure 1. 
Kenny and Harackiewicz (1979) indicated that interpretable results in 
cross-lagged analysis are most likely when the four conditions discussed 
earlier are present (i.e., reliability, synchronicity, stability, and stationarity) 
along with a large sample size. Large sample size is required because of  the 
relatively small differences likely in cross-lagged correlations. "It is our 
expectation that even a strong causal effect may produce only a small cross- 
lagged difference like .05" (Kenny and Harackiewicz, 1979, p. 374). A sam- 
ple size of  2,006 is necessary for the .05 cross-lag differential to be signifi- 
cant at the .05 level using the Pearson and Filon test (Peters and Van 
Voorhis, 1940); a sample size of  488 is required to detect a .10 difference; 
and a sample of 114 is necessary to detect a .20 difference. 
Unfortunately, this study has a very small sample size for cross-lagged 
analysis (n = 41 in 1976, n - 2 9  in 1980, and n = 26 in 1983). Therefore, 
significant differences between correlation coefficients are not likely to 
emerge. A differential of  at least .32 is necessary to be detected in a sample 
size of  41. Even if significant differences do not exist, however, hints about 
causal direction can still be obtained. That is, the causal association between 
unionization and organizational effectiveness is not likely to be independent 
of  the influences of  a variety of  other factors, so an unconditional causal 
relationship is unlikely to emerge. The best that one can hope for is evidence 
of  causal directionality, which is the intent of  this study. This sample size is 
sufficient to produce that kind of result. Significant coefficients would 
merely reflect the strength of  the relationship, not its direction. And it is 
direction of  causality that is important in this investigation. 
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FIG. 3. Cross-lagged correlation analysis of effectiveness and the presence of a 
union, 1976-1980 and 1980-1983. 
Before testing the cross-lag differentials, it was important to determine if 
the necessary four conditions were met for a cross-lagged analysis. Reliabil- 
ity of the nine effectiveness dimensions was confirmed for each of the 3 
years. Internal consistency reliabilities ranged from .83 to .99 in 1976, .72 to 
.92 in 1980, and .70 to .90 in 1983. Synchronicity was confirmed by the fact 
that both unionism and effectiveness were measured simultaneously in each 
of the three time periods, and the synchronous correlations are all suffi- 
ciently large to suggest that an a priori relationship exists between the two 
factors (see Kenny and Harackiewicz, 1979). Stability was found to be high 
among the variables. That is, the autocorrelations (e.g., roET~oEs0) are high, 
suggesting that little change occurred between 1976 and subsequent years in 
unionism or effectiveness scores. On the other hand, inspection of the mean 
effectiveness scores for each institution in each year reveals a statistically 
significant change in 19 of the schools (differential >__ .32) between 1976 and 
1983. Therefore, sufficient change in effectiveness scores is assumed for a 
meaningful cross-lagged analysis. Stationarity was tested by examining the 
cross-lag differentials to see if a change in pattern emerges (i.e., a dramatic 
change in magnitude or in the signs of the coefficients) suggesting a differ- 
ent causal relationship at different points in time. A consistent pattern was 
found. A more rigorous test of stationarity was performed by correcting 
the synchronous correlations for attenuation (see Kenny, 1975), and then 
comparing their differentials. No significant differences were found for any 
of the corrected synchronous correlations, suggesting that stationarity was 
acceptable. 
With the four conditions met satisfactorily, it became possible to examine 
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FIG. 4. Crossqagged correlation analysis of  effectiveness and the presence of a 
union, 1976-1983. 
the crossqagged correlations to determine the preponderance of directional- 
ity. Only four sets of the cross-lags are discussed he re - those  dealing with 
overall mean effectiveness scores correlated with the presence of a union 
(Up) and with years of unionization (Uy). Crossqagged correlations for each 
of  the nine separate dimensions of effectiveness were computed and ana- 
lyzed but since the results of those comparisons were largely consistent with 
the overall mean score patterns, and because a discussion of each dimension 
would be excessively lengthy (i.e., 252 correlation coefficients), they are not 
included in this paper. 
Figure 3 shows the correlations of institutions' overall effectiveness scores 
with the presence of a union in those schools. The differential in cross-lags 
between 1976 and i980 is .068 ( p <  .3), and between 1980 and 1983 it is .096 
( p <  .3). 3 Neither differential is statistically significant at the traditional 
p < .05 level, but the preponderance of directionality is clearly low effective- 
ness leading to unionism for both time periods. Between 1980 and 1983 the 
differential is greater than in the earlier time period (1976-1980), suggesting 
that the causal direction is more pronounced. Figure 4 shows the correla- 
tions over the entire study period, 1976 to 1983, and indicates that the 
differential is greater (i.e., .203 p < .2) than in either shorter time span. 
The emergence of a stronger causal association as the time lag becomes 
longer and more recent (i.e., 1980 to 1983) may suggest that the actual causal 
lag is closer to 7.years than to 3 years (i.e., ineffectiveness must be present 
for a longer time in order for it to motivate unionization) or that ineffective- 
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FIG. 5. Cross-laggedcorrelationanalysisofeffectivenessandyearsofunionismin 
institutions, 1976-1980and1980-1983. 
ness has increased in importance over time as a motivating cause of union- 
ization. The greatest growth in faculty unionism occurred in the mid-1970s, 
but there has been a marked slowing of  union formation in recent years 
(Birnbaum, 1980; Cameron, 1982). Other factors than ineffectiveness (e.g., 
enabling legislation, economic factors, union organizing campaigns) most 
likely accounted for the occurrence of  much collective bargaining in its first 
10 years (1969-1979), but more recently, ineffectiveness may have become a 
more important factor. 
Some light is shed on this association by analyzing the correlations be- 
tween overall effectiveness (OEo) and the years a union has been present on a 
campus (Uy). Union age for institutions in this study ranged from 0 to 13 
years. Figure 5 presents the correlation results for 1976-1980 and 1980-1983, 
and Figure 6 presents the 1976-1983 time period. 
Again, differentials are not large enough to be statistically significant 
(probabilities are p < . 3  in two differentials and p <  .4 in another), but the 
relative magnitudes of the coefficients are consistent with the previous inter- 
pretation; that is, continued ineffectiveness appears to be causally associ- 
ated with the long-term presence of a union. What is of  more interest, 
however, is a comparison of the differentials in 1976-1980 with those in 
1980-1983. This analysis suggests that effectiveness doesn't improve over 
time in unionized schools. Instead, ineffectiveness continues to be associ- 
ated with the presence of  unionism over the years even when no new unions 
are formed (i.e., no new unions were formed in the sample between 1980 and 
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FIG. 6. Cross-lagged correlation analysis of effectiveness and years of unionism in 
institutions, 1976-1983. 
1983). The directionality of  causation remains ineffectiveness leading to 
unionism for both time periods, and this increasing negative correlation 
over time suggests that effectiveness in unionized institutions does not im- 
prove after unionization. 
Another way to investigate whether or not effectiveness improves after 
unions are formed in institutions is to analyze the mean effectiveness scores 
of  three groups of  schools for each of  the 3 years: (1) the nonunionized 
schools; (2) a group that had been unionized 2 or fewer years in 1976, 5 or 
fewer in 1980, and 8 or fewer in 1983 (designated "new unions"); and (3) a 
group that had been unionized 3 or more years in 1976, 7 or more in 1980, 
and 10 or more in 1983 (designated "old unions"). Figure 7 plots the mean 
scores for each group across each of  the 3 years. 
Overall effectiveness increased substantially for nonunionized institutions 
between 1976 and 1980, but returned in 1983 to the 1976 levels. The two 
unionized groups were equal and relatively stable in effectiveness in 1976 
and 1980, but were lower and substantially different in 1983. Institutions 
with old faculty unions decreased in effectiveness relative to new union 
schools. In 1976 and 1980, schools with old unions were approximately 
equal in effectiveness to the newly unionized schools. But by 1983, effec- 
tiveness in old union schools was substantially lower. Old union schools 
declined relative to the nonunionized group in 1980 and then remained 
approximately the same amount  lower in 1983. 4 
This finding suggests that whereas the causal directionality is clearly inef- 
fectiveness leading to unionism rather than the reverse, effectiveness does 
not increase as unions continue to exist on campuses, although it does not 
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FIG. 7. A comparison of the overall effectiveness of institutions without a union, 
with a new union, and with an old union in three separate years. 
Potential Spuriousness 
One purpose o f  cross-lagged correlation analysis is to eliminate spurious- 
ness as an explanation, that is, to determine if variables other than the ones 
being analyzed are the true causal factors. In this study it is important to 
know if a third variable causes both unionism and ineffectiveness. If so, 
focusing on those two factors alone is misleading. Because the differentials 
are not statistically significant in this study, it is still possible that a third 
more powerful variable accounts for the relationship between unionism and 
ineffectiveness.  Birnbaum (1980, 1983) suggested that environmental  
changes cause both unionism and ineffectiveness, and therefore the direc- 
tionality being investigated here may be misleading. Birnbaum (1983) stated: 
I would suggest that it is not ineffectiveness that leads to unionization, but rather 
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FIG. 8. Cross-lagged correlation analysis of the external environment (ENV) and 
effectiveness, years of unionism, and presence of a union, 1976 and 1980. *High 
scores on this variable indicate a supportive environment that fosters feelings of 
powerfulness. Low scores indicate a controlling environment that fosters feelings of 
powerlessness. 
the environmental changes (primarily increased state control) that leads to power- 
lessness that causes unionization. It is this powerlessness that in turn causes both 
ineffectiveness and unionization. 
Fortunately, a test of  Birnbaum's proposit ion is possible with data col- 
lected from these institutions. In 1976 and 1980 (but not in 1983), respon- 
dents provided ratings of  the extent to which the external environment was 
perceived as overcontrolling, nonsupportive, powerful, regulating, and hos- 
tile. That  is, they rated the relative degree of  powerlessness of  the institution 
in relation to its external environment. A variable was constructed that 
measured the extent to which the external environment fostered feelings of  
powerlessness as opposed to feelings of  discretion and powerfulness. Figure 
8 summarizes the results. The top figure suggests that a supportive environ- 
ment (i.e., one that supports discretion and powerfulness) leads to organiza- 
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tional effectiveness. In the bottom two figures, however, the causal direc- 
tionality is reversed. They suggest that unionism leads to perceptions of a 
nonsupportive environment (i.e., one that fosters feelings of powerlessness). 
The conclusion that emerges, therefore, is that the environment does not 
take temporal precedence over either ineffectiveness or unionization. Rather 
the hypothesized causal model that results from these analyses leads from 
a supportive environment to effectiveness and from unionization to a non- 
supportive, controlling environment. Birnbaum's proposition is thus not 
supported. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that no other factors exist that cause 
both ineffectiveness and unionism to occur. Spuriousness of some unknown 
variable may have influence on both factors. On the other hand, because of 
the consistency of the signs of the several correlations being considered (no 
aberrations in the pattern occurred), and because of the increased strength 
of the 7-year differential, there is reason to believe that the ineffectiveness- 
unionism relationship has causal connections. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The major finding of this investigation is that institutional ineffectiveness 
appears to lead to the formation of unions and that, over time, unionism 
does not have a positive influence on an institution's effectiveness. The 
statistical relationships are not significant in the cross-lagged differentials, 
but significance is not to be expected in cross-lagged analyses without every 
large sample sizes. And when analyzing the institution as a unit of analysis, 
it is highly unlikely that significance at the traditional p < .05 level will be 
achieved. There simply are not enough unionized campuses in the United 
States to create a sufficiently large sample size. What should be emphasized, 
however, is that many correlations are of interest simultaneously in these 
analyses, and the consistent agreement in directionality that emerges from 
the coefficients provides evidence that temporal precedence or a potential 
causal relationship exists. Not a single exception occurs in the pattern of 
correlations. The major caution, of course, is that lack of significance leads 
to an increased risk of Type II errors in interpreting the data. 
This proposed relationship between organizational effectiveness and 
unionism also seems reasonable because of its consistency with previous 
research on effectiveness and with what is known about the motivations for 
and consequences of unionism. In the remainder of this section, some of 
that evidence is discussed in an attempt to explain why this relationship (i.e., 
ineffectiveness--unionism--ineffectiveness) may exist. Implications for 
both administrators and researchers in higher education are presented at the 
conclusion. 
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Potential Causal Explanations 
Colleges and universities are composed of  at least two separate communi- 
t i e s - t he  campus community and the disciplinary community (Alpert, 
1983). The campus community entails administrative and organizational 
activities. College and university administrators largely control and govern 
that community. The disciplinary community entails scholarly contribution 
and professionalism, and it is controlled and governed mainly by profes- 
sional associations and peer review. Unionization is more likely to occur in 
institutions where the disciplinary community is weak and where energies 
and loyalties are more closely associated with the campus community. In 
highly visible research universities, the disciplinary community is often so 
strong that it is possible for faculty to feel very little involvement and loyalty 
for the campus community (i.e., the institution, per se) and to attach their 
loyalties to the profession. When the organizational effectiveness of the 
campus community decreases or is threatened, collective action is a reason- 
able response in institutions without a strong disciplinary community. That 
is, when the campus community is the almost exclusive source of rewards 
and recognition for faculty contributions (i.e., when faculty have to rely on 
administrators for their incentive structures), and when the effectiveness of 
that campus community is threatened (e.g., when desirable incentives are 
not available), unionization may be the selected alternative for trying to 
preserve effectiveness. Unionization is less likely in institutions where re- 
wards and recognition are provided by external professional groups and 
where loyalty to the campus community is more limited. (This helps explain 
why no institution that is a member of the A A U - m a j o r  research universi- 
t i e s -  is currently unionized.) 
Thus, as faculty perceive the institution to be ineffective or decreasing in 
effectiveness, unionism may emerge as a way to consolidate efforts and 
mobilize collective influence to improve campus effectiveness (see Staw and 
Szwajkowski, 1975; Child, 1972; Thompson, 1967). Coalition formation in 
order to protect some portion of the campus community is a rational re- 
sponse (March and Simon, 1958). This is consistent with the conclusion that 
ineffectiveness leads to unionism. 
The second part of the conclusion, that unionism does not lead to im- 
proved effectiveness, is consistent with earlier research on unionism and 
effectiveness. That research found that unionized institutions exist in a less 
munificent external environment (i.e., fewer resources available) and that 
they have a lower ability to extract resources (including financial, academic, 
and symbolic resources) from those environments (Cameron, 1982). Both of 
these factors are associated with increasing effectiveness over time in col- 
leges and universities (Cameron, in press). That is, schools that improve in 
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overall organizational effectiveness over time are generally those that ac- 
quire needed resources from a relatively munificent environment. The for- 
mation of a union, which often leads to increased centralization and forma- 
lization, is unlikely to be influential in affecting conditions in the external 
environment or in improving institution-environment relations. Centraliza- 
tion restricts communication flows and boundary-spanning activities 
needed to influence the external environment. Flexibility and adaptability, 
which generally are required to acquire external resources, may suffer in 
unionized conditions. The energy of faculty leadership and administrators is 
often focused mostly on internal concerns and bargaining relationships 
under unionized conditions (Garbarino, 1975), so increased effectiveness 
may be unlikely to occur. 
Under conditions of financial or enrollment stress, when environmental 
turbulence is especially acute, the most effective institutions are those whose 
administrators focus more on environmental relations than on internal con- 
cerns. Proactivity takes precedence over reactivity in these schools, and 
institutions are flexible enough to take quick decisive action (see Chaffee, 
1984; Cameron, in press). In unionized institutions, quick decision making 
and decisive action are more difficult because of the multiple special interest 
groups needing to be satisfied and to grant approval. Turf protection, poli- 
tics, and decision making through bargaining are common, (see Baldridge et 
al., 1981; Garbarino, 1975; Richardson and Mortimer, 1978). Having organ- 
izational effectiveness scores remain low, therefore, is not a surprising out- 
come, since the dynamics of collective bargaining may inhibit characteristics 
of high effectiveness from being achieved. The dimensions of effectiveness 
constituting the academic domain, in particular, appear to suffer as a result 
of the emphasis on trade union issues and adversarial relationships (Trow, 
1975). 
Implications for Administrators 
Assuming that the major conclusion of this study has validity, three prac- 
tical implications of this research can be identified for administrators in 
institutions of higher education. First, because the negative association be- 
tween effectiveness and unionism is greatest in the academic domain, ad- 
ministrators may want to pay particular attention to possible erosion in this 
core set of activities. When energies become focused on legalistic issues and 
adversarial relations, a strong possibility exists for scholarship, collabora- 
tion, and personal development to be ignored, particularly as it relates to 
teaching and research. Consideration might be given to incentive systems 
and formalized programs to ensure that the academic domain of the institu- 
tion is not neglected, especially in the early stages of unionization when 
UNIONISM AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 407 
there is most pressure to deflect attention away from scholarship, personal 
development, academic creativity, and scientific collaboration. 
A second implication for administrators points out a paradox. Proactive, 
entrepreneurial, and externally focused strategies have been associated with 
improving effectiveness over time (Cameron, in press), yet these are among 
the conditions that are difficult to foster under unionized circumstances. 
Conservatism, protectionism, defensiveness, and reactivity are more typical 
of administrators faced with adversarial coalitions (Cameron and Chaffee, 
1984). Therefore, consideration might be given to formalizing boundary- 
spanner roles, quality circles, strategic management teams, and other mech- 
anisms oriented toward maintaining an open, anticipatory stance toward the 
environment and the future. Monitoring and planning for external contin- 
gencies is a prerequisite to preserving and enhancing effectiveness, so those 
activities should not be lost when administrators are pressed to respond 
continually to internal institutional concerns. 
A third implication relates to the kind of relationship that is fostered 
among faculty and administrators on unionized campuses. The major issues 
in bargaining in higher education are almost always traditional trade union 
issues-i.e., wages, job security, and grievances-and adversarial relation- 
ships are not atypical of the interactions that occur relative to those ques- 
tions. However, administrators may want to separate trade union issues from 
organization effectiveness issues and to foster a different kind of relation- 
ship with faculty with regard to enhancing institutional performance. Col- 
laboration and collegiality need to be established among institutional mem- 
bers in at least some areas if the school is to do well in adapting to its 
environment. That relationship can be enhanced by partitioning the norms 
that govern faculty-administrator relationships. Rules of interaction should 
be different when the issue is academic excellence, for example, than when it 
is fringe benefits. 
Suggestions for Researchers 
In addition to practical implications, the results also have implications for 
future research on unionism and effectiveness. For example, the general 
conclusion of this paper helps explain one reason why some studies have 
concluded that significant negative consequences of unionism appear in 
institutions while other studies have concluded that no such consequences 
appear. When comparing nonunionized institutions with those that are 
unionized, significant differences have been demonstrated in their effective- 
ness. However, one reason for those differences may be explained, on the 
one hand, as the erosion of effectiveness in the institution and the subse- 
quent unionization of the faculty. On the other hand, once unions are 
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present  in ins t i tu t ions ,  effect iveness does no t  change  dramat ica l ly ,  but  it 
cont inues  to erode.  Therefore,  when c o m p a r i n g  ins t i tu t iona l  condi t ions  be-  
fore and  af ter  un ion i sm,  s igni f icant  differences may  no t  occur  because  o f  
the  smal l  impac t  o f  un ion i sm on ins t i tu t iona l  funct ioning.  W h e n  c o m p a r i n g  
un ion ized  and  nonun ion i zed  schools ,  however, s ignif icant  differences do  
appear .  This suggests tha t  researchers  shou ld  no t  on ly  be consc ious  o f  the  
k inds  o f  c o m p a r i s o n  groups  used in s tudying  the impac t s  o f  un ion i sm,  bu t  
tha t  the  causa l  re la t ionships  be tween un ion i sm and  ins t i tu t iona l  effective- 
ness shou ld  be more  careful ly  and  more  b r o a d l y  s tudied.  E thnog ra ph i c  case 
analyses  may  help i l lumina te  this re la t ionship  as well as to ta l  p o p u l a t i o n  
s tudies  using all un ion ized  ins t i tu t ions .  In  any case, long i tud ina l  research 
shou ld  take p r io r i t y  over snapsho t  or  cross-sec t ional  analyses .  
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NOTES 
1. In 1983, fewer respondents were sent a questionnaire than in the previous two studies. The 
average receiving a questionnaire in 1983 was 18 (approximately six administrators, six 
trustees, and six faculty members), as compared to approximately 50 in 1976 and 75 in 1980. 
Therefore, the smaller n in 1983 could be a biasing factor in the results; but because all three 
samples included exactly the same positions at the institutions, there is no reason to believe 
the bias would be significant. 
2. In 1980, significant differences existed for all dimensions except System Openness and 
Community Interaction. In 1983, significant differences existed for Organizational Health 
in addition to the three academic domain dimensions. 
3. Point biserial correlations were computed in this analysis, since the unionism variable (Up) 
was coded 1,0. Differentials are computed by subtracting roE76U80 from rOESOU76 and by sub- 
tracting roEsou8~ from r0Es3u8 0. 
4. No significant differences existed between the three groups in 1976, but nonunionized 
schools had significantly higher scores than unionized groups in 1980 (p< .05) and the old 
union schools in 1983 (p< .01). Significance was not reached in 1983 when comparing the 
means of the two unionized groups (19< .2). 
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